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Keynote Address: The Right to Scrutinize
Government: Toward a First Amendment
Theory of Accountability*
ANTHONY LEwIs**
The speaker eschews the view that the press enjoys a "pre-
ferred position" under the first amendment and aligns his be-
liefs with the view of Alexander Meiklejohn-an informed pub-
lic is necessary for the success of a self-governing democracy.
Mr. Lewis analyzes case law and concludes that the Court
should cautiously "develop the principle of public accountabil-
ity as a fundamental premise of the first amendment," guaran-
teeing a limited right of acquiring information to scrutinize
government.
"[I]nformed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints
upon misgovernment.. .. "I So wrote Mr. Justice Sutherland in
1936. He is not a liberal hero among the Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States, but he surely deserves a modest niche
in the reconstructed pantheon for his opinion in Grosjean v.
American Press Co.2 That was the second of our great legal tests of
freedom of the press, decided by the Supreme Court just five years
after Near v. Minnesota.3
The issue in the Grosjean case was a tax that Huey Long's
Louisiana imposed on newspapers: a flat two percent of gross re-
ceipts on all journals with a circulation of more than 20,000 a week.
The Supreme Court found that the tax violated the free press
guarantee of the first amendment,' as applied to the states by the
fourteenth amendment. Of course newspapers are not immune
from taxation, Justice Sutherland said; but this tax was reminis-
cent of the 18th-century English levies on newspapers, which had
been resisted in Britain and the American colonies as "taxes on
* This is the text of the keynote address delivered at the Fifth Annual Baron de Hirsch
Meyer Lecture Series. A student editor, working in collaboration with Mr. Lewis,
subsequently added the footnotes.
** Columnist, the New York Times. Lecturer in Law, Harvard Law School. B.A., 1948,
Harvard College.
1. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
2. Id.
3. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). I note that Grosjean was argued on January 14, 1936, and de-
cided on February 10, 1936. How many major constitutional cases are decided these days
just 27 days after argument?
4. The first amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
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knowledge." 5 Their purpose was to limit "the acquisition of knowl-
edge by the people in respect of their governmental affairs."6 And
"the aim of the struggle" against them, Justice Sutherland said,
was to "preserve the right of the English people to full information
in respect of the doings or misdoings of their government. '7
I begin with what must seem ancient history, the Grosjean
case, because Justice Sutherland's words provide a framework for
discussion of what I think is today the most important and hotly
contested issue under the speech and press clauses of the first
amendment-the right of the people, as he put it, to acquire
knowledge "in respect of their governmental affairs." 8 It goes by
other names now-the right to gather news, the right to know, the
right of access to public institutions. But the same essential is in-
volved that Justice Sutherland saw: the need for "an informed...
public opinion" to keep governments "in due subjection" 10 -that
is, to prevent either corruption or autocracy.
"The core of the first amendment" is a phrase much in vogue
these days. Lawyers argue that activities are at that core or at va-
rying distances from it, as if the amendment were a giant electro-
magnet. Whatever the grace of the metaphor, there is no doubt
what we have in mind when we use it. The first amendment has
been held to protect a wide range of artistic and other expression,
but its paramount function, historically and analytically, is to as-
sure the working of democracy by protecting the free exchange of
political information and ideas.
Professor Meiklejohn put it this way:
Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an
issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or
doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue,
just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced plan-
ning for the general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking
process of the community against which the First Amendment
to the Constitution is directed. The principle of the freedom of
speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-
government."
5. 297 U.S. at 246.
6. Id. at 247.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. (citing 1 T. ERSKINE, SPEEaCHES OF LORD ERSKINE 525 (High ed. 1876)).
11. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1965) (emphasis in original).
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The early first amendment cases were about freedom to propa-
gate opinions. Justice Holmes in 1919 spoke of "free trade in
ideas.""' That was in the Abrams case, which involved the publica-
tion of what he called "puny" 18 leaflets supporting the Bolsheviks
in Russia. The theory of our Constitution, Holmes said, is that
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market."" Ten years later, in a
case involving the doctrine of pacifism,'6 he spoke of "freedom for
the thought that we hate."'I s That constitutional battle, for free-
dom to argue ideas however extreme or unwelcome, has now been
won. I think the end was signified when Justice Powell wrote for
the Court in 1974: "Under the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea.' 7
The issue now is facts, especially facts about the business of
government. We see this in the most important contemporary Su-
preme Court decision on freedom of speech and press, New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.'8 Enormous libel damages were imposed on
the Times and on four black Alabama ministers because some of
the facts were wrong in an advertisement, signed by the ministers
and published in the Times, that criticized southern officials for
their racist practices. Justice Brennan said there must be some al-
lowance for factual mistakes in criticism of official conduct, for
otherwise "the citizen-critic of government"19 would be deterred
from his "duty. ' 's0 The words seem to me to embody the philoso-
phy of Alexander Meiklejohn."
Facts were again the issue, in more sensitive circumstances, in
the Pentagon Papers Case.22 There the United States tried to stop
the New York Times from publishing parts of a secret official his-
tory of the Vietnam War. JudgeMurray I. Gurfein of the District
Court for the Southern District of New York denied the Govern-
ment's request for a preliminary injunction.28 His view was eventu-
12. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 629.
14. Id. at 630.
15. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
16. Id. at 655 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
17. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. Id. at 282.
20. Id.
21. See A. MRIKLXJOHN, supra note 10.
22. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
23. 328 F. Supp. 324 (1971).
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ally vindicated in the Supreme Court, 4 but I think no other judge
put the reasons for refusing to stop publication as well as he did:
A cantankerous press, an obstinate press, an ubiquitous press
must be suffered by those in authority in order to preserve the
even greater values of freedom of expression and the right of the
people to know. In this case there has been no attempt by the
Government at political suppression. There has been no attempt
to stifle criticism. Yet in the last analysis it is not merely the
opinion of the editorial writer or of the columnist which is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. It is the free flow of informa-
tion so that the public will be informed about the Government
and its actions. '2
The social reality to which the first amendment must be ap-
plied has also changed over the last two generations in a funda-
mental respect: the size of government and its functions. In 1931,
in Near v. Minnesota,2 Chief Justice Hughes sought to justify the
holding that prior restraints on the press are presumptively invalid
under the first amendment by saying that "the administration of
government has become more complex, the opportunities for mal-
feasance and corruption have multiplied . . ., and that showed
the need for "a vigilant and courageous press."2 But as we see it
from the vantage point of today, American government in 1931 was
marginal to the society. Washington was a sleepy southern town,
and the Federal Government took little or no responsibility for the
economy, employment, health, education, or the environment. Fed-
eral spending took just 5.5% of the gross national product.2 9 Today
Federal Government expenditure is 21.5% of G.N.P., 0 and Wash-
ington is a bureaucratic colossus that touches just about every per-
son, business, and group interest in this country. State and local
government is growing even more rapidly. And so the challenge to
the Meiklejohn principle of an informed public controlling the gov-
ernment has become much more formidable. Big government re-
quires more scrutiny by the public to prevent abuse-but its very
24. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
25. 328 F. Supp. at 331.
26. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
27. Id. at 719.
28. Id. at 720.
29. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE NATIONAL INCOME
AND PRODUCT AccouNTs OF THE UNITED STATES, 1929-74 (A Supplement to the SURVEY OF
CURRENT BUSINESS) (1976).
30. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS (Feb. 1980).
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size and complexity make that public duty more difficult. As gov-
ernment has grown, it has acquired defenses against scrutiny.
Armies of public relations officers now protect nearly all official in-
stitutions, with the signal exception, I am happy to say, of the
courts. Particular interest groups, from trucking firms to cancer re-
searchers, have cozy relationships with the government bureaucra-
cies that regulate or subsidize them; and the mere public is hard
put to understand how it may be affected.
For all these reasons, information about the working of gov-
ernment is a valuable commodity in our society. And the right to
acquire that information has become a crucial aspect of first
amendment liberty. "[Plublic debate must not only be unfettered,"
Justice Powell said in 1974; "it must also be informed." ' But he
said it in dissent. The Supreme Court has often stated that the
right to receive information is included in the first amendment
along with the right of free expression. Indeed, the first federal
statute ever found by the Court to violate the first amendment was
one that inhibited the receipt of information."2 In Lamont v. Post-
master General," the Court struck down a law that obstructed the
right of citizens to receive through the mails from abroad what
postal officials determined to be "Communist political propa-
ganda." A Virginia law prohibiting the advertising of drug prices
was similarly held unconstitutional because the statute kept the
public "in ignorance" of what it was entitled to know. 4
But in other cases, dictum notwithstanding, the Supreme
Court has denied claims of a right to acquire information under
the first amendment. The Court rejected a suit seeking a passport
valid for travel to Cuba, contrary to the State Department restric-
tions of the day, so that a citizen could inform himself of condi-
tions there.33 It rejected the claim, strongly pressed by journalists,
that they had a right to gather news and a corollary privilege not
to testify before a grand jury when to do so might compromise
their confidential sources.6 It rejected a claim that newsrooms
should be exempt from unannounced police searches-searches
31. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
32. The provision in question was the Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act
of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-793, § 305 (a), 76 Stat. 840 (1962).
33. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
34. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
35. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
36. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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that might disclose the names of sources.37 It rejected arguments
that members of the press were constitutionally entitled to access
to prisons, under reasonable regulations, so that they could look
into conditions there.sa And finally, last Term, it upheld against
both sixth and first amendment objections the closing of a pretrial
hearing in a criminal case to both press and public.8' That was the
Gannett case, the most important in this series of decisions, I
think-and the one most likely to lead the Court, in the end, to a
more sensitive view of what I would call the right to scrutinize
government.40
There are difficulties in framing a general theory of a right to
acquire official information. More of those later. But I think there
were particular problems in the cases I have mentioned-distorting
factors in the way both the parties and the Court approached the
issues. Analysis of those factors may help explain why the Court
has been so slow to vindicate the right to scrutinize.
First, the parties-and they were usually from the press-paid
scant respect to other. interests in making their claims for informa-
tion. The Court was understandably reluctant to recognize claims
so nearly absolute that they would tend simply to override compet-
ing values. Thus in the reporters' privilege case, Branzburg v.
Hayes,41 Justice White said for the majority that "news gathering
is not without its First Amendment protections."' 43 To that reluc-
tant generality he added in dictum specific suggestions that the
Court would not countenance exposure of journalists' sources for
the sake of exposure," or grand jury subpoenas for the purpose of
harassing the press.44 But he declined to create a journalists' privi-
lege because it would damage other important interests. The inter-
37. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
38. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. S17
(1974).
39. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
40. A postscript: Some months after this talk, with its expressed hope that reflection on
Gannett would lead the Supreme Court to take a more sensitive view of the right to scruti-
nize government, the Court did just that. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S.
Ct. 2814 (1980), a 7-to-1 majority held that the first amendment gives the public a right of
access to criminal trials. This article has not been revised to take retrospective account of
the decision. Suffice it to say that Richmond Newspapers at least opens the possibility of
developing a general right of access to official institutions and information, defined in terms
of the need for accountability.
41. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
42. Id. at 707.
43. Id. at 699-700.
44. Id. at 707-08.
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est involved in that case was law enforcement, through the ancient
device of a grand jury entitled to every man's evidence.' 5 Justice
White also mentioned the necessary privacy of some official pro-
ceedings, such as the conferences of the Supreme Court itself, from
which he said the press was regularly excluded despite the loss to
news-gathering." Still another interest that might well be sacri-
ficed on occasion, if a reporter's privilege were read broadly into
the first amendment, is fair trial. That was the problem in the Far-
ber case,' 7 when a reporter wrote stories about unexplained hospi-
tal deaths years before, suggesting that a doctor had poisoned the
patients. When the doctor was prosecuted for murder, he sought
all of the reporter's notes, and the New Jersey Supreme Court said
he was entitled to them.48 His demand seems to me to have been
too sweeping, but a defendant on trial for his life surely does have
a strong interest-rooted in the sixth amendment"-in seeing
notes that may disclose prior inconsistent statements by prosecu-
tion witnesses or other exculpatory matter. So long as claims of a
"right to gather news" seem to the courts to be of an exclusivist
character that threatens other important values, I doubt that most
judges will be hospitable to them.
Second, the press in my view made a serious mistake in seem-
ing to claim a special status under the first amendment-a pre-
ferred position-giving journalists rights that are not available to
others. Justice, Stewart took that position six years ago in a notable
speech at the Yale Law School,60 saying that the press clause of the
first amendment was "a structural provision ' protecting a partic-
ular institution, the "established news media."' 2 I have explained
at some length elsewhere why I find Justice Stewart's thesis uncon-
vincing.as It is enough to say briefly now why I think the press does
itself injury when it adopts Justice Stewart's proposition as its
own.
There is, to begin with, no historical basis for the Stewart
45. Id. at 688.
46. Id. at 684. He might have to qualify that statement now. See B. WOODWARD & S.
ARMSTRONG, THE BRffHREN (1979). But see Lewis, Supreme Court Confidential, New York
Review of Books, Feb. 7, 1980, at 3; id., June 12, 1980, at 47.
47. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
48. Id. at 281, 394 A.2d at 341 (after in camera inspection by the court).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
50. Address by Justice Stewart, Yale Law School (Nov. 2, 1974), reprinted in Stewart,
"Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631 (1975).
51. Id. at 633 (emphasis in original).
52. Id. at 631.
53. See Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism? 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595 (1979).
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thesis. The long English struggle over licensing of the press snd
seditious libel involved not only newspapers but books and pam-
phlets.5' The framers of the first amendment, with this English
history in mind, gave no evidence of intending to confine the pro-
tections of the press clause to periodicals, excluding other forms of
publication. The natural explanation of the speech and press
clauses together is that the framers wanted to protect expression
whether in unprinted or in printed form. Nor do the decided cases
draw any distinction in the quality of protection given by the
amendment to newspapers on the one hand and to books or pam-
phlets on the other, or in the applicability of special doctrines
(such as that disfavoring prior restraints) to the press and to vari-
eties of speech.65
The definitional problem would be severe if "the organized
press" were to have exalted status; would editors and publishers be
happy to have judges deciding who was qualified for that rank? In
principle, moreover, it would be quite wrong to give journalists a
higher constitutional position than, for example, professors or for-
mer Central Intelligence Agency officials, whose writings play a
valuable part in informing the country about vital public ques-
tions. When the Supreme Court heard argument in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia," a successor case to Gannett, Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe of the Harvard Law School was arguing for
two reporters who were excluded from a Virginia criminal trial
when Chief Justice Burger asked whether the case would be any
different if a law school professor who wanted to study the crimi-
nal process had been excluded from the trial. "Is there any differ-
ence," the Chief Justice asked, "in whether a person wants to at-
tend to write something or make a speech about it?"'57 "None," Mr.
Tribe wisely replied, "nor if he just wanted to inform himself as a
citizen."58
I do not think that the Court as a whole is hospitable to Jus-
tice Stewart's suggestion. And there is a further reason of self-in-
54. For example, John Milton, in his famous piece in opposition to the censors, wrote
that he sympathized with the conscientious censor who must be "the perpetual reader of
unchosen books and pamphlets, ofttimes huge volumes." J. MILTON, Areopagitica, in COM-
PLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 716, 734 (Hughes ed. 1957).
55. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (city parade
ordinance so vague that it violates the rule disfavoring prior restraints).
56. 48 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-243).
57. Exchange noted by author at oral argument before the Supreme Court of the
United States, Feb. 19, 1980.
58. Id. See also 48 U.S.L.W. at 3549.
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terest for the press to avoid making the claim of special rights for
journalists. If the press succeeded in getting special treatment
from the courts, would it be as effective in arguing that judges
should keep their hands entirely out of editorial decisions-
arguing, as Chief Justice Burger said, that editing is what editors
are for?59 If a newspaper were held to be constitutionally entitled
to access to a prison while a prison reform organization were not,
might the newspaper not risk greater accountability (in libel, for
example) for what it published? 60 The lure of press exceptionalism
should be resisted.
Third, I think the Supreme Court's view of the problem-the
problem of acquiring information essential to self-govern-
ment-has been obscured by old symbols and old rules. Not just
the Court but all of us may be so moved by the powerful words of
Holmes"' and Brandeis"' that we think about the first amendment
as if we were still in the age of soapbox orators or puny pam-
phleteers. We are not. Of course there still are the occasional ec-
centrics whose cases make noble doctrine. But in terms of moving
public opinion, of exerting real influence on policy, what matters is
the tension between Big Government and Big Media. It is not a
brief, isolated relationship like that between the streetcorner
speaker and the policeman who arrests him. There is a whole net-
work of relationships between powerful government departments
and powerful newspapers or magazines or broadcasters, between
officials and a sometimes worshipful press, between discontented
government insiders and investigative reporters. The relationships
are sometimes friendly and sometimes adversary, but always com-
plicated. A clash between the Nixon Administration and an estab-
lishment newspaper whose natural respect for office has been
eroded by the Vietnam War's cannot so easily be analogized to a
conflict between the county attorney for Hennepin County, Minne-
sota, and an anti-semitic scandal sheet that published only nine
issues."
Sometimes old formulas are pressed to a point where they lose
their real meaning. Consider the question of pretrial comment that
59. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1973).
60. See Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred Position," 28
HASTINGs L.J. 761 (1977).
61. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
63. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
64. Those were the facts in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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may compromise the unbaised character of the jury that is later to
decide the defendant's guilt or innocence at trial. In Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart" in 1976 the Supreme Court consid-
ered circumstances that I would have thought presented an ex-
treme risk of prejudice. In a small town a defendant was charged
with horrifying crimes-multiple sexual murders. A local court for-
bade the press to publish, before the trial, stories about his alleged
confession or other material strongly suggesting his guilt. The
Supreme Court held unanimously that such an order against the
press violated the rule against prior restraints." In that aggravated
situation, newspapers and broadcasters were thus free to circulate
the most damaging accounts. But then last Term, in the Gannett67
case, the Supreme Court stated that a New York judge who was
concerned about the remote possibility of prejudice in a case to
which the press had paid little attention was constitutionally enti-
tled to close his courtroom entirely when he held a pretrial hearing
on a motion to suppress evidence. 68 Can it make any sense to have
a virtually absolute rule allowing the press to publish almost any-
thing it learns about a pending criminal case, however prejudicial,
while allowing judges to close criminal courtrooms without any
showing of possible prejudice? To me it seems that form has de-
voured substance."
The facts of the Gannett case make clear that what was really
at stake was not just the sixth amendment right to public trial,
which a majority of the Court found for substantial reasons ran
only to the defendant; if he waived it, the general public or press in
effect had no standing to protest. The larger interest at stake was
what Professor Meiklejohn called "the necessities . . . of self-gov-
ernment. ' '7 0 The suppression hearing in Gannett took place in Sen-
eca County, New York, in 1976. In that county and that year not a
single felony prosecution went to trial; all were disposed of before
65. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
66. Id.
67. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
68. Id.
69. Compare the British rule, contained in the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, Part 2, § 3, 2
Eliz. Under this Act the press and public may attend committal proceedings-where the
magistrates decide whether there is enough prosecution evidence to hold the accused for
trial-but no account of the proceedings may be published until after the trial itself. The
rule against publication may be waived by any defendant. This system prevents secret judi-
cial proceedings while at the same time avoiding the possibility of prejudicial impact on
future proceedings.
70. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 10, at 27.
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trial.7 In this country generally the overwhelming proportion of
criminal cases are settled by pleas or dismissals before trial.7 2 As
Justice Blackmun said in dissent in the Gannett case, "The sup-
pression hearing often is the only judicial proceeding of substantial
importance that takes place during a criminal prosecution."7 3 Jus-
tice Blackmun said: "Open trials . . . enable the public to scruti-
nize the performance of police and prosecutors in the conduct of
public judicial business. Trials and particularly suppression hear-
ings typically involve questions concerning the propriety of police
and government conduct that took place hidden from the public
view. ' '17
In short, what was really involved in the Gannett case was the
principle of our system of government that public institutions
must be publicly accountable. That is the correct way to look at all
these cases, not as if they presented simply claims by a journalist
or anyone else to a right of access to particular information. The
question in each case is whether the denial of access, the sealing of
the public process, effectively prevents accountability.
Openness, one must quickly say, is not the only way to make
an institution accountable. The Supreme Court would not be able
to function, I think, if its conferences were televised. The Justices
could not be free in their exchange of views. But the Court meets
the requirement of accountability in full by publishing its judg-
ments and the reasons for them. The prison cases are troubling
precisely because there may be no way to hold the managers of
those institutions accountable if outsiders are not allowed to in-
spect them. As Justice Stevens said in dissent: "Without some pro-
tection for the acquisition of information about the operation of
public institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the pro-
cess of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would be
stripped of its substance."'7 Again, I hear echoes of Meiklejohn.
I think we are at a point when the Supreme Court can begin,
71. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 435.
72. See, e.g., material cited in id. n.14. (figures for New York State).
73. Id. at 434 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 428.
75. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 32 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also a
speech by Justice Stevens, excerpted in Stevens, Some Thoughts About a General Rule, 21
Amz. L. Rav. 599 (1979). The speech discusses what Justice Stevens called a general rule
drawing "a sharp distinction between the dissemination of information or ideas, on the one
hand, and the acquisition of newsworthy matter on the other. Whereas the Court has ac-
corded virtually absolute protection to the former, it has never squarely held that the latter
is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever." Id. at 602.
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slowly and carefully, to develop the principle of public accountabil-
ity as a fundamental premise of the first amendment. But if that
development is to take place, we can see that some cautions have
to be observed. When a claim is made for the minimum access or
information needed to scrutinize a public institution-to make it
accountable-the claim cannot be an absolute one. Those who ad-
vance it should frankly recognize that courts will have to weigh
that interest against others: privacy of official deliberation, for ex-
ample, or law enforcement, or serious risk to fair trial, or prison
security. The press, then, will have to forswear claims of exclusive
or superior rights. It will have to accept Justice Powell's definition
of its role as "an agent of the public at large."76 The press, he said,
"is the means by which the people receive that free flow of infor-
mation and ideas essential to intelligent self-government. By en-
abling the public to assert meaningful control over the political
process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting the socie-
tal purpose of the First Amendment. '77
Then the Court itself will have to begin looking at the old
problems addressed by the first amendment in light of contempo-
rary cultural reality. It will have to see the process of political ex-
pression and information as just that: a process, not a collection of
isolated events. The Court will have to understand that an im-
mensely complicated, continuous, changing set of relationships de-
termines, these days, whether the public can effectively scrutinize
and criticize its government. The Court will have to recognize, as
Professor Owen Fiss of the Yale Law School has said 7 8 that reali-
ties require the protection today of something more than what can
be defined in the abstract as "speech." A whole network of activi-
ties among government officials, professional communicators, and
private institutions and groups contributes to the informing of the
public. The Court will have to take account of that network if it is
to give continuing content to the first amendment's guarantee of
political freedom, of democratic control.
It will not be easy. Courts will naturally, and wisely, be wary
of creating rights that are difficult to limit. Judges will not want to
get into the business of drawing constitutional lines on how much
access the public must have to every public function or institution.
As Justice Stewart said in his Yale speech, the Constitution is not
76. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Extemporaneous remarks of Professor Owen Fiss at New York University in honor
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RIGHT TO SCRUTINIZE
a Freedom of Information Act. 79 What we are talking about is a
minimum principle-a rock-bottom level of accountability neces-
sary to prevent what the framers of the Constitution, knowing that
men are not angels, feared above all: abuse of official power. I
think, for example, of a prison in which large numbers of unex-
plained deaths occurred, from which fearful rumors emanated, but
which no outsider was ever allowed to visit-not journalist, or law-
yer, or relative. Or I think of the courtroom sealed when there was
no substantial showing of risk to fair trial. Such facts would make
compelling occasions for a fresh look at the question of public ac-
countability under the first amendment.
Justice Brennan, in a speech at Rutgers,80 pointed the way to-
ward that re-examination by the Supreme Court. He suggested
that the first amendment, in its protection of free speech and
press, deals with two different concepts. There is speech or publi-
cation as such, in the classic sense: "the right of self-expression," e
"the right to speak out."'" To that the amendment gives very
great, nearly absolute protection. But the amendment does more,
Justice Brennan said. It "forbids the government from interfering
with the communicative processes through which we citizens exer-
cise. . . our rights of self-government. . . . Another way of saying
this is that the First Amendment protects the structure of commu-
nications necessary for the existence of our democracy."' In that
larger, more complex model, there can be no absolutes-if indeed
there ever can, in the real world. The Constitution, with all its con-
cern for the communication needed for self-government, also pro-
tects other values-and so must judges. So Justice Brennan gave
some polite advice to the press if it wishes to advance the cause of
freedom in a complicated democracy: It may have to accept, he
said, "a certain loss of innocence, a certain recognition that the
press, like other institutions, must accommodate a variety of im-
portant social interests. ' ' "
The framers of the Constitution knew that the tendency of
those who govern is to accumulate power. In the first amendment
they sought to vest in the governed the countervailing force of
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information. Governments are much more powerful today than
James Madison ever imagined, and we have become much more
dependent on them. The public's need for information is corre-
spondingly greater. If the first amendment is to have meaning in
today's political society, it must guarantee a basic right to scruti-
nize government and hold it accountable.
